

Archetype revisited: Innovation or revisionism?

By José Medina Rosas

Translation: Matthew May

The Meaning

One of the newest and most promising approaches -especially if it is understood as a beginning and starting point for new reflections and approaches to empirical material- offered today from the field of Jungian psychology is undoubtedly the theoretical-practical approach of Javier Castillo's archetypal systems. I am personally convinced of the value, importance, necessity, and urgency of this approach. The breadth of vision provided by the model, the amount of data it contains, and its explanations, more than justify its implementation.

Javier Castillo's model was first presented in 2020 in his book *Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions*, where the author describes and gives examples of the five archetypal systems identified as "nuclei of meaning" ¹. It is a model that is very comprehensive ² and rigorous with the principles of Jungian psychology while at the same time attentive to the criteria of the academic world, of the university, in which the author has been developing his work for many years, augurs the happy possibility of a productive rapprochement between the university world and the Jungian training institutions, a rapprochement that we have not seen up to now in many places.

I find an antecedent to the model developed by Javier in the "archetypal systems" of attachment and rank mentioned by Anthony Stevens and John Price in the book they co-authored ³. Although in this case, each of these two large repertoires of behaviours and ideations are understood as archetypal systems in themselves, one being the attachment system, the other the rank system, within Javier's understanding that they should be treated as a single system, the attachment-rank system, thus accentuating the opposition within the same archetypal system.

1 Castillo, J., Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions, p. 77. The five systems are: self-regulation-elaboration, crisis-renewal, connection-differentiation, agency-affiliation, and progression-regression.

2 It would of course be possible to develop other pairs of opposites that would also fall into the category of "archetypal systems", but the systems described are for the author the main ones Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions, p. 115.

3 Stevens, A. and Price, J., Evolutionary psychiatry, p. 115.

From my point of view, this theorisation of archetypes being identified as systems is consistent with the more classical Jungian formulation and that the consideration of the archetype is understood as a core meaning rather than as an image, a form. Indeed, Jung pointed out that beyond form it was also possible to consider the archetype as a core of meaning, with the necessary nuances:

"An archetype is determined in its content when - and this is the only verifiable thing - it is conscious and has therefore been filled with the material of conscious experience. (...) The archetype is an empty element in itself, an element which is nothing more than a *facultas praeformandi*, a priori possibility of the form of representation. (...) The archetype: in theory can be given a name, and it possesses an invariable nucleus of meaning which in principle always determines, but never concretely, the form under which it presents itself. For example, the form in which the mother archetype is empirically presented cannot be derived from it alone but depends on other factors" ⁴.

Thus, from the comprehension of the archetype understood as meaning, or core of meaning, it is precisely this core that somehow "determines" the aspect or form that the archetype adopts. First the meaning, then the form. However, we can only know this meaning from consciousness, that is, by speculating on the image, or even without the image, but speculating. Jung, following an empirical conception of psychology, always preferred to give priority to the form over the meaning in the understanding of the archetype, at least when dealing with it theoretically.

But in practice Jung did not always maintain the priority of image over meaning. For example, a circle, a castle, and a tree can, according to Jung, represent the same archetype, if we understand this as the nucleus of meaning, in this case the Self archetype ⁵; despite being such different forms, for Jung they represent a single archetype. However, in these cases the empiricism of Jung's method comes, if not from the formal analogies between these images, then from the analogy of meaning between the contexts in which we find such images.

⁴ Jung, C. G., "The Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype", in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, §155.

⁵ I would like to point out that it seems to me a great virtue to keep the capital letter in the term "Self" as Javier Castillo does in his works, differentiating it from the "self" understood as personal identity. Although Jung agreed to translate his notion of the Self with a lower case in the English edition of his *Complete Works*, this initiative came from one of the editors, Michael Fordham, who justifies the lower case on various grounds (in his book *Freud, Jung, Klein - the fenceless field*, p. 259). On the contrary, for Jung his concept of the Self is written with a capital letter, as he expresses in *Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, vol. 2, pp. 280 and 282

When, however, it is for example a snake that represents the image of the hero's antagonist both in ancient Egypt and in modern times ⁶, then the form (of the snake) is empirically the same, the same archetype. But if the form of the snake were to appear in another context in which it proved to lack the other elements by which Jung defined the hero's antagonist archetype, i.e., the shadow archetype, then from a Jungian point of view it would not be considered the same archetype, it might not even be considered an archetype even though it takes the form that one of them usually has. The form is not the only thing that defines the archetype, even in Jung's own work.

Among the five archetypal systems described by Castillo, I am interested in highlighting one of them here because of its relevance for the clarification of the archetype concept, the system of self-regulation-elaboration ⁷. In this system, self-regulation is an effect of the autonomy of nature, which in this case orientates the subject with the aim of maintaining psychological homeostasis, and therefore its function is analogous to

that of the Jungian Self, while elaboration refers to the constructive capacity of the individual's psychological ego to accept, reject or modify the orientation proposed by the self-regulating component of the system. Thus, on the one hand we have the self-regulating activity of nature, on the other our own conscious activity, both of which create sense and meaning in a dialectical relationship, each component of the system participating in it according to its own strengths. In other words, sense or meaning is discovered, but it is also invented.

In the same way, an archetype is not only discovered, but also invented. An archetype is not only discovered as a spontaneous and autonomous manifestation of nature or the unconscious, but also from consciousness we grant it certain characteristics that, in the human way of seeing, define it. Perhaps the most graphic example of this is the archetype of order, the number. The convention and cultural construction by which natural numbers are written as 1, 2, 3, etc. does not hide the fact that behind this cultural creation lies the reality that in nature there are also 1, 2, 3, or any other numbers of determined types of objects, we did not invent them.

I would call this nuclear element of the constructive-representational archetype transitionality or subtlety 8, because of the resonances it has with Winnicott's concept of transitional object/space 9, although for Jung this transitionality would not be defined in Winnicott's way but in the way the alchemists understood Mercury, that is, it would also be a space in which reality and fantasy meet, only that the latter is understood as *imaginatio vera*, true imagination.

6 For example the serpent Apophis of the Amduat and the snake Nagini in the Harry Potter saga.

7 "We could also have called it guide-construction", Castillo, J., *Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions*, p. 81.

8 I think it is more appropriate to define "subtle" not as the quality of being elevated or ethereal but as something even more difficult to perceive and understand, more subtle. I define "subtle" as the intermediate quality between the accessible and perceptible, on the one hand, and the inaccessible and unknown, or, as an intermediate "space" between the celestial and the earthly.

9 Winnicott, D. W., *Playing and Reality*

Concerning the idea of the archetype as a conceptual core of meaning that is in principle devoid of form - both personal and mythical - i.e., the transition from image to meaning, some caveats and historical considerations should be noted.

The Jungian psychologist Wolfgang Giegerich points out that Zarathustra can be considered the first representative of the constitutive principle of thought such as logos, in contrast to the principles of mythical thought. Zarathustra's doctrine inaugurates the level of conceptual thought. Zarathustra, however, is rather a precursor of this new level of thought 10, for it is in ancient Greece that this conceptual thought first appeared in history and was considerably developed.

Giegerich goes on to argue that the passage from myth to logos must ("logically") be a sudden, abrupt, and absolute "cut" that once and for all abandons myth and definitively enters logos, but he also states that this has never happened, which he says

is because the full realisation of this definitive separation takes time and actually happens as an ongoing process through the alchemy of history 11.

Today some Jungian psychologists, without being followers of Giegerich's psychology or even without knowing his ideas or openly rejecting them (but following his same logic 12), are nevertheless in favour of this definitive leap or cut from myth to logos, from the archetype to the new conception of the archetype that surpasses, cancels, and replaces it. As we say, the first time that this "cut" happened in a more notable way was in archaic Greece, but from then until now, humanity, through traditional stories, tales, films, and even scientific fantasy, etc., has not ceased to produce images with a powerful mythical quality. Because the imaginal, incidentally, forms such a close part of the reality in which we live that its extirpation, if it is ever achieved (and who would want to achieve it...?), can only be produced artificially, through a negation of what is most proper to human nature, the imagination.

And how often do the products of the unconscious show us their image but not their meaning? Not infrequently.

10 Giegerich, W., "The reality of evil? An analysis of Jung's argument", in *Dreaming the myth onwards*. C. G. Jung on Christianity and on Hegel, p. 262.

11 Giegerich, W., "The occidental soul's self-immurement in Plato's cave", in *Technology and the soul*, p. 248.

12 Giegerich's great achievement is, in my opinion, to make explicit a thought, a psychology-animus, which underlies the most varied expressions of different currents of opinion, in groups and in individuals who in one way or another share with Giegerich's thought the same "logic", which I have called "Hegelian logic", cf. Medina, J., *Analytical Psychology Notes on "Hegelian" Logic*
https://www.academia.edu/45704990/Apuntes_de_psicolog%C3%ADa_anal%C3%ADtica_sobre_la_l%C3%B3gica_hegeliana_and_La_farsa_hegeliana_2.0_en_la_obra_de_Wolfgang_Giegerich
https://www.academia.edu/45735743/La_farsa_hegeliana_2_0_en_la_obra_de_Wolfgang_Giegerich
.This thought is certainly not Jung's thought, but its exact opposite. The fact that he exposes, even sometimes in spite of himself, that archetypal form of thought (which is not a form), which is that of the negative animus, earns Giegerich a place of honour within Jungian psychology, of which he is in another sense as much inside as outside.

The Image

In dreams it is the image that comes first. The empirical study of dreams begins with the image, but the psychoanalytic and psychologist-analytic approach to the world of dreams has generally not been well understood within the average academic field. This misunderstanding has been contributed to by the fact that in the dream it is often possible to find images analogous to the mythical images of the gods of all religions.

Images of the gods are upsetting, and rightly so. Mythical images are not innocent. With them we are not dealing with spontaneous products of the psyche but with culturally processed psychic products, so that in mythology there is an ideology, principles, and cultural prejudices descriptive and prescriptive of reality. Today Hades abducting Persephone is not an acceptable mythical image, but its reality is certainly a long way from being eradicated from human nature.

However, a science, even if it is a science of the soul, such as analytical psychology is, cannot fear or take into account such considerations. Dream images, whatever they may be, are a fundamental object of study for psychological analysis.

In his book 'An introduction to dream interpretation', Javier Castillo proposes the contemplation of Theodor Abt's typological approach to the world of painting in order to interpret dream images. We will see this with an example.

Each psychological function opens a different avenue of interpretation, a specific way of questioning. In the words of Theodor Abt 13:

- 1) Perception function: what is there?
- 2) Feeling function: What is important? Where is the energy?
- 3) Thinking function: How are things connected?
- 4) Intuition function: where does it come from, where does it go?

13 Abt, T., Introduction to Picture Interpretation: According to C.G. Jung

Let's see this approach applied to the following dream as told by Javier Castillo:

" I'm in a new house and I decide to clean a section of the fence that surrounds it. It's a fairly tall fence that surrounds the front of the house, although there is a space that is left open at the back. "

Javier interprets the dream following Theodor Abt's indications for the interpretation of pictures in the following way (we will omit the characteristic of introversion, with which Javier also performs the interpretation, and we will focus on the four functions):

- 1) Description of the oneiric plot, analysis of its elements, regarding the form of the images, colour, characters, situations, etc. The characteristics of the dream images are noted down.

"All the images that form part of the dream storyline are described with a certain clarity, although the colours of their various parts cannot be specified (perception). The dream presents the following pictorial representations: the new house (not associated with any other), it is a large house, a type of villa or country house; the fence, whose mission would be to protect the space and create a certain intimacy; the cleaning related to ensuring that the barrier is in good condition and has a good appearance; the open space, in the rear area of the property, could indicate a certain failure in the defensive system or a certain flexibility in this structure".

- 2) Establishment of the order of importance of the images in the dream. The accentuated emotion of an image indicates the increased relevance of that

image. It is a question of locating where the emotion is, that is, the factor that reveals the importance of the image for the dreamer.

“In the dream, the dreamer’s figure was crucial in looking after the fence in her new home (new life, new relationships, new vital space, and new consciousness). Also, it is significant the fact that there is a part of the fence that is unprotected (feeling). It is contradictory to maintain a fence but to leave a part open, this would indicate a significant vulnerability.”

- 3) Establishing the logical order between the different parts of the dream, determining their internal relationships and, subsequently, their connection with the images of the daytime world. For Jung, the interpretation of the dream requires relating it to the dreamer's conscious situation; it is a matter of finding out what the dream tells us about that conscious situation.

“The dreamer needs to create a space for privacy and protection, which during some time was not possible because she was exposed to a lot of anguish in her difficult marital relationship; although, it should be noted that there are still difficulties in marking specific limits, as reflected by the open unfenced space (thinking).”

- 4) What does the dream tell us in terms of what goes beyond the dreamer's present conscious situation? Or what future conscious situation does it point towards? In which direction is the energy moving? We orient ourselves as to which direction the dreamer's psyche is developing.

“The dream indicates a position of the dreamer’s oneiric ego is in tune with this young woman’s need to walk in a direction of learning to create a firewall defence that allows her not to be so exposed to certain existential dramas (intuition).”

From the first interpretation to the last, in this order, we can observe an "increase in subtlety". Thus, in the first interpretation, guided by the perceptual function, what we have is basically the dream itself, whereas in the interpretation guided by intuition, the data used for the examination of the dream images are not to be found in the dream at all. However, already in the perceptual interpretation we find conjectures provided by the analyst's knowledge: "the fence, whose mission would be to protect the space and create a certain intimacy", "the cleaning related to ensuring that the barrier is in a good condition and has a good appearance", "the rear area of the property, which could indicate a certain failure in the defensive system or a certain flexibility in this structure".

Theodor Abt points out that "to prevent a one-sided approach to pictures", in this case to the dream, we must know well which is our main function and which is our lower, less effective function, in order to be aware of our strengths and weaknesses in the

interpretation in 1), 2), 3) and 4), as well as to be able to "give energy to each function" according to how we are using it for the acquisition and interpretation of the dream.

A second piece of advice from Abt is to formulate both a hypothesis and a counterhypothesis of what the picture represents, that could be valuable to ask the question "what is the opposite of my assumption? The importance of this counterhypothesis "is that it forces us to maintain a healthy doubt" about the meaning of each concrete image. The same is also advisable in the interpretation of dreams.

Returning now to what we said in the previous section about the archetypal system of self-regulation-elaboration, we must be aware that "the interpretation of a dream [whether it contains archetypal images or not] can only aspire to be a construction "14, since the meaning itself is not shown to us, but only the image. This constructivism does not only refer to dreams, because "from an analytical position, meaning is something to be constructed "15, which tells us that in the practice of psychotherapy we are not only faced with the discovery, or concealment, of meaning, but in a more essential and therapeutic way, the creation of meaning, a creative act in which the patient naturally has a lot to say, even beyond all the therapist's possessed knowledge of their skill and science.

Of course, there are "certain clues that help us to think that one interpretation is more correct than another, although this does not exclude, in many cases, having to leave the interpretation open"16 , but both the preference for the more "correct" interpretation and the option of keeping the interpretation open are secondary to the possibility that the patient has to use the dream images "to elaborate new narratives that allow them to be more in tune with themselves, but that can be perceived as closer to their point of origin (archetype in Jung and O in Bion) "17. In other words, it is the patient who takes upon himself the task of creating the meaning of their own psychic experience, and therefore of their life, which allows them to give it meaning and orientation 18 thanks to the construction of narratives that have their starting point in an image or a succession of images such as those of a dream.

Although dream images take their representative form not only from unconscious expressions and meanings, but also from conscious ones as well, for even "the so-called primal image [or archetype] is, in part, a construction of our consciousness "19, yet in a deeper way "the "perspective of the unconscious" would be told through dream images and in its dialogue with consciousness could become a central aspect of the creation of meaning and renewal of life (facilitating the breaking of the subject's fixations) "20. Therefore, the patient constructs meaning in his life out of the images presented to him by his soul, which is nothing other than what Jung called "symbolic life".

Dream images allow us to think and ask ourselves questions, examine our unconscious side and from it, knowing it, make the appropriate determinations, according to our own criteria.

15 Castillo, J., Razón y fuerza del mito, p. 95

16 Castillo, J., Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions, p. 243

17 Castillo, J., Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions, p. 215

18 It must be borne in mind that from the point of view of analytical psychology, the unconscious is always capable of exerting a not negligible influence even on the products of consciousness most apparently remote from its influence, since "the unconscious premeditates all new thoughts and all the new combinations. And when consciousness approaches the unconscious with a desire, it has already been the unconscious that has inspired it "(Jung, " Cryptomnesia ", in: Psychiatric Studies, §172)

19 Castillo, J., Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions, p.76

20 Castillo, J., «Analytical psychology and integrative psychotherapy», in Psychoanalytic Psychotherapies, p. 27

Thus, in Javier Castillo's approach the archetypal reality, from which the nuclei of meaning expressed in the different archetypal systems are extracted, is formed by images 21; that is to say, first it is the image, the form, the archetype in its most classical sense, then the meaning, the narrative construction. What the new model adds is a deeper understanding of the meaning of the image, a deeper analysis of the interiority of the archetype.

Decaffeinated Jung?

I have shown how Javier Castillo pays attention to both meaning and the image in his model, but not all innovations in analytical psychology have the same integrative character, just think of the so-called "soul's logical life" 22 that according to Giegerich claims to replace the outdated and premodern concept of the archetype. Such a de facto logical life does away completely with the image and form. It is therefore not acceptable, because with such a theoretical approach we gain nothing but only lose. That is not what psychology is about. Giegerich tries to mould Jungian psychology to his understanding of what "modern ideas" require, in the end the Jung that emerges as a result has little to do with the real Jung, and Jungian psychology is lost along the way.

But the truth is that Jung's work is not the only one that in recent times is being adapted, in the most diverse ways, to the most recent discoveries of science and its narrow margins of interpretation and understanding. For some years now it has also been the turn of Nietzsche, who from certain quarters is increasingly seen as a "philosopher of the mind". From this perspective, the philosopher Daniel Dennett has no qualms in declaring that the Nietzschean will to power is inconceivable to him 23, but that the Nietzschean philosopher of the mind is very welcome insofar as it confirms his own ideas. In Nietzsche's work, the will to power is not a well-defined, clear or unambiguous concept, but if philosophers were to dismiss it in such a way, they would have forgotten what their profession is.

The concept of the will to power is central to Nietzsche's work just as the concept of the archetype is central to Jung's work. In a similar way to what happens with

Nietzsche, many of Jung's concepts are at the limit of what we can know ²⁴, which in no way is a demerit, nor a regression or involution, but rather an advance, that is precisely what intuition is for, to go further, not to take us back to the limits of what is known and, therefore, definable.

The archetype concept, like the will to power concept, cannot be defined because we simply do not know what it is. We can work with it, but its ultimate reality must remain indeterminate, because I insist, we do not know what it is, Jung did not know what the archetype really consisted of, which, let us remember, is in itself unknowable.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is not possible to study and work on/with the archetype. As I see it, the archetype is understood in the classical Jungian way as a unity of image and meaning containing the following elements:

- Universality (absolute or relative)
- Bipolarity (positive-negative)
- Emotionality (energy)
- Thought/Meaning
- Imaginality/Representationality
- Transitionality (subtlety)
- Transgressivity (psychic-physical)

It is clear that formulating a "unified theory" of the archetype that incorporates all its elements and characteristics ²⁵ is currently beyond our reach.

²¹ Castillo, J., *Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions*, p. 77.

²² Cf. Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life*, p. 77.

²³ Obviously, in spite of this extreme position of Daniel Dennett, perhaps more Darwinist than philosopher, in general there is no attempt in the current philosophical panorama to do away with the will to power formulated by Nietzsche, neither by "renewing" its formulation nor by ignoring its proposal.

²⁴ "I deal with psychological facts that move at the limit of the knowable" (Jung, *Mysterium coniunctionis*, II §183).

²⁵ For example the numinous characteristic of the archetype, which derives mainly from its energetic, meaning, transitional and transgressive aspects.

Jung's thinking on the archetype cannot be closed, nor can it be resolved in any way, for the time being it is not possible to do so. This is a problem especially for the scientific sector, which does not tolerate ambivalence and mystery in its considerations, and whoever does so is branded as "esoteric scholarly" (*IAAP News Sheet* 18, p. 22, (Mills)).

But the fact remains that we do not know the ultimate foundation of either our physical existence or our psyche. This is the truth, which is admitted even reluctantly by the scientific sector - as long as this ultimate reality is neither theorised about nor named, neither by calling it an archetype nor by any other name-. They want nothing to do with it, and so the concept of the archetype has to be reformulated and revised just like the Nietzschean will to power, or else it has to be avoided, in order to calm and reduce anxiety. This is neurosis, and by virtue of this neurosis an attempt is made to "fix" reality so that it conforms more closely to "our inalienable striving for an emancipated individuality, rationality", because otherwise, the unfathomable mystery, the mere brush with ultimate meaning, would be felt "as an imprisonment, as a nightmare" 26. These considerations have nothing intellectual or academic about them, nor can they be taken seriously by an impartial investigator, by a researcher.

Before calming and reassuring reformulations, we should ask: have we understood Jung? Sometimes it seems that the answer is: no. As is the case with the following text:

"Jung was obviously convinced that archetypes are genetically imprinted and transmitted from one generation to the other via biological pathways. Meanwhile there is a huge amount of evidence, from biology, genetics, developmental psychology etc., which speaks clearly against this assumption. Understanding the human genome led to the insight that symbolic information cannot be genetically encoded. Also, even if there are genetically preformed mental patterns, they are subject to strong influences from the environment via epigenetic processes; the key concept of contemporary theories of human development is gene-environment-interaction. There is a strong consensus of experts dealing with archetype theory in the last two decades, that Jung's assumption of a biological/genetical transmission of archetypes cannot be supported any longer" (IAAP News Sheet 18, p. 14).

Let us remember, "Bismarck once said: "Lord protect me from my friends, I will take care of my enemies"27. The quoted text is part of an internal newsletter of the International Association of Analytical Psychology (IAAP) which proposes a revision of the archetype concept in the light of current knowledge from which this difficult term can be approached. A laudable undertaking which we hope will yield important results in the future.

But it should be noted that besides the fact that Jung reiterated not infrequently that what is inherited is not the archetypal image, but the capacity to form such images, and certainly without such a capacity of our nervous system it would be impossible both to perceive and to produce any kind of archetypal image, it seems that the above text also forgets the "transgressive" quality of the archetype, whereby "archetypes do not appear only and exclusively in the psychic realm, they can also do so in non-psychic circumstances. (Homogeneity of an external physical process with a psychic one)"28, what Jung called "synchronicity".

From the materialistic, Darwinian and neo-Darwinian point of view, the role of synchronicity has always been obliterated, insofar as it relates to the archetype in any other aspect. Even without participating in the explicit thinking of Giegerich, who is

known to maintain that synchronicity is irrelevant, many Jungian psychologists were already Giegerichian without knowing it, at least in this respect.

26 Giegerich, W., «The end of meaning and the birth of man: an essay about the stage reached in the history of consciousness and an analysis of C. G. Jung's psychological project», en *The soul always thinks*, p. 193

27 Jung, C. G., *Encuentros con Jung*, p. 299

28 Jung, C. G., « Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle », *The structure and dynamics of the psyche*, §954

Anthony Stevens himself, in his book *Archetype Revisited*, sidesteps all questions concerning synchronicity, as indeed he basically does in the rest of his books. Although synchronicity can be considered based on the actual experience of it that we can regularly have, it has no place in the current scientific paradigm, and as such points out which facts are observable and which are not.

As an unexpected advocate of a scientific concept closer to that which Jungian psychology may aspire to rather than to the modern concept of science, I will here quote Heidegger, who, against the ultramodern notion of the concept of science derived from the so-called "hard sciences", pointed out sharply that the omnipresence of the experimental method in modern science has made us lose sight of the fact that science (ἐπιστήμη/Wissenschaft) consists precisely of " a specific self-enclosed whole comprised of a manifold of grounded knowledge, that is, of cognitions drawn exclusively and judiciously from the very things the science seeks to know."29.

This is Jung's empiricism, which becomes a science in its own right, starting first of all from the study and observation of the psychic image, of the synchronistic image, we might also say, even of the physical image, whether it be a pictorial representation, for example, or of some other kind. In this sense it is first the archetype, the form, then the archetypal system, the meaning. Yet the separation of image-meaning only differentiates itself with these two words what it is not, as in essence, it is no more than a single entity.

"The confusion about the definition is an intolerable situation" (IAAP News Sheet 18, p. 22). I agree, insofar as this obfuscation against the indefinable serves as a spur to find new formulas of definition, i.e., a new approach to the phenomenon. I myself have modestly tried to clarify the archetype concept by speaking of "archetypal thought", which reflects what is expressed in the Jungian term "idea" as set out in the glossary at the end of *Psychological Types*, as well as in other passages of Jung's referring to "pre-existent thought", an analogue of the archetype, its other expression. I therefore differentiate between archetype understood as meaning, what I call archetypal thought, and archetype understood as form, image, the archetypal image 30, which I will discuss further in the last section of this paper. I believe that this solves certain confusions that can arise from the not always clear conceptualisation of the archetype in Jung's work, while opening up new possibilities for understanding certain ideas and

philosophies as a product of the archetype, thus understanding them from a broader and more Jungian perspective.

But to adapt Nietzsche and Jung to our understanding of their works is to reduce them to our own level. We do them no favours, nor do we raise them to higher heights of understanding. We surpass nothing.

29 Heidegger, M., *Logic: The Question of Truth*, p. 11

30 Cf. Medina, J., Archetypal thinking

https://www.academia.edu/47847805/El_pensamiento_arquet%C3%ADpico

All innovations in analytical psychology must consider that we are not primarily offering a product to the consumer, but we are investigating the truth, wherever it leads us, within the limits of health and life. Everything is fine as long as we do not pretend to replace what is not replaceable. The fact that Jung points beyond what our mind is sometimes capable of considering does not authorise us to "sublate " 31 Jung or to camouflage his ideas in garments that, in the end, do not belong to him.

Once again in the history of Western society we are living in a time of transition from myth to logos, now, for example, from the will to power to the philosophy of mind, or from the archetype to archetypal principles. So again, we welcome the pre-eminence of logos wherever it prevails today. In any case, Jung's work continues to speak for itself, as does that of Nietzsche.

If in the present and future innovations that will inevitably follow, as is always the case in the development of science, we manage to avoid creating a "decaffeinated Jung", we will have achieved a great success.

Beyond Dionysus

To conclude, I will briefly outline my innovative proposal which aims to clarify to some extent what the archetype is understood as, above all in its aspect of meaning. I will resort to the example of the classical images of the gods, divine images so valued by some and reviled by others, even within Jungian psychology itself. I hope this will be understood intuitively.

Beyond the mythical images in which certain aspects of a given "divine" logic crystallise (Mars, the logic of war, Aphrodite, the logic of love, etc.), any one of these logics has many more contents and possibilities than those expressed in each singular mythical image of a given culture. Proof of this variability of content is that all divine images are in fact difficult to define beyond their general contours, and their characteristics are drawn only by the mythical episodes that the various authors of myths that have existed throughout history have concocted (and in this sense the archetype is constructed, or as Machado would say, truth is also invented 32).

31 Cf. Medina, J. *Relation and power. Sublation as a psychological concept*

https://www.academia.edu/61212242/Relaci%C3%B3n_y_poder_La_sublaci%C3%B3n_como_concepto_psicol%C3%B3gico

32 Proverbs and Songs, XLVI

Beyond Apollo and Dionysus 33 are the logics of Apollo and Dionysus. So, for example the tantra is to be found in the logic of Dionysus, but here sexuality and ecstasy is no longer madness, but these characteristics are perfectly channelled into the psychological and physical health and the cultural environment. "What Dionysism called orgiasm corresponds exactly to the Tantra"³⁴. Moreover, "by the power of initiation, man will be able to become fully conscious and master the reality of what he has intuitively perceived in orgiasm. This constitutes enlightenment. Man must therefore first, through orgiasm, sense the reality of certain forces in himself and outside himself". Dionysus is thus continued in Shiva in the aspects discussed above, within the same common logic in which both divine images participate.

So, the traditional (and modern) fear of the sexual and frenzied madness of Dionysus should be tempered by the knowledge that, from Shiva onwards, the more exuberant Dionysian satisfaction of our sexual instincts can be fully channelled and realised, without any fear of "madness "³⁵.

The mythical images of Dionysus and Shiva are effectively traversed by the same defining logic, just as light is a continuous wave but can also be observed in quanta of light, in this case the quanta of light are the specific images of the gods.

This logic underlying the diverse images makes it possible to speak, for example, of a "Shiva-Dionysus way", which according to Alain Daniélou is "the only way that could allow humanity to save itself "³⁶.

Daniélou favours the hypothesis of a cultural transmission from ancient India to ancient Greece as far as the "innovation" of the image of Dionysus is concerned, but in any case the logic that we have here called Dionysian goes beyond not only the figure of Dionysus but also that of Shiva and would eventually become a reality in the lives of each of us and of our ancestors and descendants even if the images of Dionysus and Shiva had never been invented. This is the reality and power of archetypal logic, which stands above human imaginative capacity.

If we understand the Dionysian logic, we will understand the philosophy and psychology of Dionysus (Dionysus the philosopher and Dionysus the psychologist) much better and more completely than through any of the images that represent this god or gods, images that are all partial, incomplete, and blurred, that allow us to see that there is something there but not to know what that something actually is ³⁷. This new understanding of the archetype is necessarily speculative, not empirical. Nevertheless, one way of empirically approaching the logos of these archetypal images could consist of a comparison and analysis of the different images that can be identified within the Dionysian logic: Shiva, Wotan ³⁸, Dionysus, Bacchus, etc.

As can be seen, attending to this logic rather than to the various archetypal images makes it possible to go beyond the cultural conditioning in which archetypal images are inevitably involved. This logic, in itself unknowable in its totality and obviously ungraspable, does not impede, far from it, but rather encourages, at a given moment in an individual or in a situation Dionysus to express himself, in Shiva, in another, why not, or any other new image of God that expresses a new aspect of that same logic hitherto unknown or not made manifest. This logic, or logics, can by no means be perfectly defined and explained, its study is always a work of unconcealment, of going beyond the image, but preferably with the image.

On the other hand, by extending the notion of archetype beyond the form into the realm of meaning in this way, we can apply it - *mutatis mutandis* - with full entitlement to the field of thought and philosophical systems, in which the thoughts of the various authors will have to be understood as "archetypal thoughts", when we find that they are indeed archetypal. For example, the archetypal thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, or that of Friedrich Hegel, two logics of opposite character which put forward diametrically opposed positions, individuation, and adaptation, respectively, 39 as fundamental perspectives at the core of their ideas, both are archetypal thoughts which we find in every time and place, even without being expressly formulated.

33 But which Dionysus are we talking about when we speak of Dionysus? Let us recall that Cicero went so far as to distinguish 5 different Dionysos, cf. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*, III 58.

34 Daniélou, Alain. *Shiva and Dionysos*, p. 201.

35 On the other hand, perhaps the Bacchic rage is not as we have been told. For example, in his book *Bacchanales*, P. A. Fernández de la Vega argues historically that the persecution against the followers of the god Bacchus carried out in 186 B.C. by the Roman Senate had the darkest overtones of any witch-hunt. In this persecution, the privileged classes of Rome did not hesitate to cover the Bacchic religion with infamy and slander in order to get rid of this annoying cult that threatened the moral foundations of the State. In the same vein, Rafael López-Pedraza said, probably quite rightly, that the figure of Dionysus has always been presented to us blurred, distorted, in all his images, cf. R. López-Pedraza, *Obra reunida 1*, p. 358.

36 Daniélou, Alain. *Shiva and Dionysus*, p. 12.

37 I agree with Heidegger: "Logic (...) does not need to deal with imagination. (...). It is indisputable that traditional logic does not deal with pure imagination. (...) But it is also no less doubtful that logic - since it has made thought, in a certain sense, its only subject - offers the guarantee of being able to delimit or even just get the full essence of thought right. (...) Kant says expressly: "On the contrary, the schema of a pure concept of understanding is something that cannot be brought into any image (...). This schematism (...) is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul. (...) If image is equivalent to empirical aspect in the broadest sense, then, apparently, the schema of the notion does not allow itself to be brought "to any image". (...) Notions, as original concepts, cannot be brought into such images" (Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, pp. 86-87, 126). On the other hand, "μῦθος [myth] (...) and λόγος [logos] essentially co-pertain. "Myth" and "logos" appear in opposition, often wrongly discussed, only because they are the same in the poeticising and thinking of the Greeks" (Heidegger, *Parmenides*, p. 92).

38 "The Shadow of Dionysus", cf. Bishop, P., *The Dionysian Self*

39 I have discussed this in *Psychology of Dionysus: Nietzschean Logic* and in *Analytical Psychology Notes on Hegelian Logic*.

From the point of view that I am presenting, the "Image of God is its Logos" 40, the words of Clement of Alexandria in the second century A.D. which point to the identity of the logos with the archetypal image: the images of the gods refer to a logos, and vice versa. We find in this author an idea of logos very similar to the one I am outlining: it is a "pedagogical logos" 41 that, like the course of a river, leads the water of our thoughts, and therefore our behaviour, in a certain way and direction, and not in another. Clement's identification of this Logos with the Second Person of the Trinity, with Christ and his faith, however, seriously limits his understanding of the logos and makes him a fervent servant of the Logos-Christ, in a Christian, as if there were no other "divine" logics, or if there were, they should be discarded. In any case, as Clement of Alexandria says "we are images of the Logos" 42, a statement that subordinates the image to the logos, first the logos, then the image in which, in each case, the logos is shrouded, both in the world of the imagination and in the world of material realities.

The logic I define in this section possesses the seven elements of the archetype of which I have spoken previously (in the case of the representativity element, also especially verbal representativity), including the characteristic of numinosity that is commonly observed in the followers of one or another philosophical thought. The logos is a "doing-seeing" of things in a certain way, it is a perspective and a proposed way that can be equally both true and false 43, it is in reality and as a whole many perspectives and many ways, although in each individual and cultural case the way and the perspective that manifests itself in our world is a specific one and not any other, not all ways and perspectives can be fully manifested at the same time.

In contrast to anima-psychology, which understands the archetype as an image, animus-psychology understands the archetype as meaning, not as a linguistic reality, this is only one of its possible expressions 44, but as a "rational soul", I prefer to call this "rational soul" Spirit 45. In Marius Victorinus, an author from the 4th century A.D. who also identifies the Logos with Christ, as was to be expected in a Christian author, we find already in a remarkably developed form the Logos-anima differentiation, i.e. animus-anima: "non enim λόγος anima, sed rationalis" 46, Victorinus speaks in a differentiated form about "caelestis νοῦς vel λόγος et caelestis anima" 47, on the one hand on the celestial νοῦς or λόγος, and on the other hand the celestial anima 48.

40 Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, p. 168.

41 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *The Pedagogue*, p. 168.

42 Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, p. 196.

43 Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 52-54.

44 For Giegerich however the soul-animus is a linguistic and cultural reality, "the soul is fundamentally a linguistic reality" (Giegerich, *What is soul?*, p. 44).

45 This universal Spirit or mind was from very early on the subject of attention in Indian thought, cf. Juan Arnau, *The diaphanous mind*

46 "logos is not soul, but [something] rational", Marius Victorinus, *Opera theologica*, p. 51. Although Giegerich probably rightly points out, taking up earlier works, that anima and animus in Latin are often interchangeable words without too much loss of meaning despite their different nuances, and in any case do not always mean two different psychological "organs" or "functions" (cf. Giegerich, *Animus-Psychologie*, p. 20-21), logos and anima can, however, already be found in ancient literature clearly differentiated, and let us remember that for Jung the animus is first and foremost logos. The fact that the psychological concept of animus refers primarily to a lower or diminished logos should not hide from us that the parallelism logos superior-animus positive, which we also sometimes find in Jung's work, can also be understood - by virtue of the macrocosm-microcosm relationship - as a parallelism logos/cosmic animus-logos/psychological animus of the individual. But to take these distinctions into account and explain them adequately would take us too far away from the purpose of the present paper.

47 Marius Victorinus, *Opera theologica*, p. 97.

48 In this author, who "is one of the great unknowns of Latin literature", "Latin philosophy finally reaches adulthood" (Michael von Albrecht, *History of Roman Literature*, volume II, pp. 1469-1470).

As far as Javier Castillo's archetypal systems are concerned, I would speak of a logic of crisis-renewal, a logic of connection-differentiation, etc., or a logic of crisis, a logic of renewal, etc., logics that go beyond any of the particular images in which they are expressed, that have more meaning than any of the concrete and empirical images we can know.

According to Plotinus, *Enneads III 16,50*, "the Unitary Reason [λόγος] of the cosmos is a unitary reason constituted by opposites, as it is such a contraposition that constitutes its structure and, so to speak, its essence". This is, as far as we can know, the structure of the λόγος: nuclei of meaning which are configured as opposing principles and which on many occasions, from their unilaterality, claim to be the only true λόγος, when really they all are 49.

Javier Castillo has proposed in his model the pairs of archetypal opposites that are most useful for clinical practice, also included within his approach are the pairs: thought-feeling, sensation-intuition 50 (Jung), schizoparanoïd position-depressive position (Klein/Bion), to which I would add: attachment system-rank system 51 (Stevens and Price), and from a rather philosophical perspective: Nietzschean logic-Hegelian logic. All these together form a new map of the soul, indeed a map of the spirit.

This is my thesis: in its aspect of meaning, the archetype is constituted as a "logic" that goes far beyond each of the archetypal images as they appear both in the imagination of every individual and in the collective representations of every culture, such images expressed equally in the individual and in the culture as only certain episodes of a logic that in itself is of far greater scope and meaning than any of its concrete manifestations.

This is the real soul's logical life.

49 To speak of "nuclei of meaning", of known meaning, refers us to consciousness, not to the unconscious, but this is only partly true because we do not in any way pretend to know absolutely what these "nuclei of meaning" consist of, most probably the greater part of what these nuclei consist of remains unknown to us, unconscious, so we agree with Jung: "one can affirm that the soul is consciousness and its contents; this in no way impedes, but even favours, the discovery of a previously unknown background, of a real matrix of all conscious phenomena, a before and an after, an above and a below of consciousness. The moment one grasps a concept of a thing one succeeds in grasping one of its aspects, although one usually succumbs to the delusion of having grasped the totality, without taking into account that a total recognition is quite impossible" (Jung, "Theoretical Considerations on the Essence of the Psychic", in *The Dynamics of the Unconscious*, §356). Moreover, that the logos of which the pre-Socratic philosophers, first of all Heraclitus, began to speak, as well as concepts closely related to this logos, and thus the logos of most of the later classical tradition, all refer to the modern notion of the "unconscious", has already been opportunely pointed out, cf. Belén Castellanos, *El inconsciente ontológico de Gilles Deleuze*, the chapter "El inconsciente en la filosofía: unconscious in philosophy: a concept of late formulation", §356.

50 These 4 functions: thought, feeling, sensation and intuition are probably the primary and fundamental sources of logos, which must be related to the 4 rivers of Paradise (Jung, *Aion*, §311), which are "the fourfold river of logos" (Jung, *Mysterium coniunctionis*, II §25).

51 As Javier Castillo points out, the archetypal systems of connection-differentiation and agency-affiliation are related to the motivational pattern of attachment, *Dynamic Psychotherapy Oriented by Dimensions* pp. 96 and 104.

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